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Abstract: In this paper, we use the “2002 Chinese Household Income Project Survey” (CHIP2002) 
data to examine how heterogeneous social interactions affect the peer effect in the rural–urban 
migration decision in China. We find that the peer effect, measured by the village migration ratio, 
significantly increases the individual probability of outward migration. We also find that the 
magnitude of the peer effect is nonlinear, depending on the strength and type of social interactions 
with other villagers. Interactions in information sharing can increase the magnitude of the peer effect, 
while interactions in mutual help in labor activities, such as help in housing construction, nursing and 
farm work in busy seasons, will impede the positive role of the peer effect. Being aware of the 
simultaneity bias caused by the two-way causality between social interaction strengths and migration, 
we utilize “historical family political identity in land reform” as an instrumental variable for social 
interactions. However, the hypothesis that probit and instrumental-variable probit results are not 
significantly different is not rejected. The existence of a nonlinear peer effect has rich policy 
implications. For policy makers to encourage rural–urban migration, it is feasible to increase education 
investment in rural areas or increase information sharing among rural residents. However, only an 
increase in the constant term in the regression, i.e., a “big push” in improving institutions for migration, 
can help rural Chinese residents escape the low equilibrium in migration. 
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1.  Introduction 
Rural-to-urban migration and hence urbanization are key symbols of economic development. 
Especially for developing countries, policies promoting migration from the countryside to 
cities are structural forces for sustainable growth. However, except for well-known migration-
facilitating measures such as infrastructure and human capital investment, are there other 
policies to promote migration? This encourages us to explore further the determination of 
labor migration. In this paper, we attempt to answer two questions. First, how does the peer 
effect—interdependence in decision making—affect the migration decisions of rural residents 
in China? Second, how do social interactions of different types and frequencies affect the peer 
effect in migration? 
Using the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIP2002) data, we find 
strong evidence that the peer effect exists in the outward migration decision in rural China. 
This finding has two important interpretations. On the one hand, in the presence of the peer 
effect, other policies, such as increasing the education of rural residents, have larger effects 
than previous estimates because of the spillover of the peer effect or the so-called social 
multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2002). On the other hand, however, the rural–urban segmentation 
policy in China will also limit the equilibrium migration ratio to a low value and thus be 
harmful for the process of urbanization. 
With the recent increasing concern about nonlinearity in the peer effect (Ballester et al., 
2006; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006; Patacchini and 
Zenou, 2008), we also develop a model to incorporate heterogeneous peer effect. In our model, 
the magnitude of the peer effect depends on within-peer-group social interactions that may 
consume time during the outward migration decision. Empirically we interact the peer effect 
with different types of social interaction and obtain some interesting results: higher interaction 
frequencies in information sharing with other villagers will enhance the magnitude of the peer 
effect, while higher interaction frequencies in time-consuming local labor exchange activities 
will reduce the positive role of the peer effect. These findings are consistent with Narayan’s 
(1999) proposition that social capital has two forms: bonding and bridging. While the 
affluence of bonding social capital (in our context the labor exchange activities) will directly 
increase the social welfare of a community, more internal communication will, however, 
make the community close and lowers its members’ inclination of outward migration, which 
is an important way of reducing rural poverty. 
The presence of the peer effect implies multiple equilibria in labor migration, either a 3 
 
low-level equilibrium, which our policy simulation shows, or a high-level one. If social 
interactions of different types and frequencies affect the peer effect in migration, new social 
policy tools can be utilized to push ahead rural–urban migration and urbanization. Policy 
makers seeking to encourage outward migration can either increase education or promote 
information sharing among villagers. However, neither of these two policies can shift the 
equilibrium to a high-level one even if we combine the two. To achieve a high migration ratio, 
it is more important to eliminate urban-biased policies and accelerate social integration 
between rural and urban areas. This is what we emphasize in our paper: the institutional “big-
push” in China.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews studies on labor 
migration in China and empirical strategies for identifying the peer effect. Section 3 
establishes a simple model to demonstrate how the peer effect is affected by heterogeneous 
social interaction strength. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 presents the 
econometric model and empirical findings. The social interaction strength may potentially be 
endogenous because of unobserved family culture or reverse causality; therefore, in Section 6 
we use the “historical family political identity in land reform” as an instrument for social 
interaction strength. Section 7 presents policy simulations, in which we explore the effects of 
different policies on labor migration equilibrium. The final section concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
Many empirical studies have explored migration determination. In classical theories, the 
factors affecting the labor migration decision are a group of individual and family 
characteristics. In migration studies for China, the classical framework is also applicable. 
Using cross-sectional data in the Sichuan rural areas, Zhao (1999a; 1999b) finds evidence 
consistent with findings in other countries: male laborers have a higher probability of outward 
migration, while aging and more household land area will significantly decrease the 
probability of migration. Zhu (2002) finds that the income gap between farming and nonfarm 
activities will affect the migration decision, which is consistent with the Harris–Todaro model. 
Cai et al. (2003) discover that although the income gap between west and east China is 
greater than that between middle and east China, migration is more prevalent from middle to 
east than from west to east, which seems to contradict the Harris–Todaro prediction but still 
can be explained by distance effects. 
Recent studies add the role of social networks to the analysis of the migration decision. 4 
 
                                                       
Munshi (2003) finds that networks play a significant role in helping rural Mexican residents 
migrate to the US. Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007) argue that with the expansion of migration 
networks, more poor families can engage in migration, thus reducing rural inequality. Using 
Chinese data, Zhang and Li (2003) find that rural residents have a higher probability of being 
employed in the nonfarm activity if their family has social ties outside the village. Bao et al. 
(2007) find that province-to-province migration rates rise with the size of the migrant 
community in the destination province. Zhao (2003) shows that larger numbers of local 
experienced migrants will significantly increase the migration probability of villagers in the 
same village, and she argues this is the result of job information sharing among villagers. 
Although findings about the role of social networks extend our understanding of labor 
migration, all of these empirical studies only consider the peers in one’s community as the 
network that provides information to reduce migration costs. However, as Bauer et al. (2002) 
point out, peers in the community also contribute to herd/peer effects even in the presence of 
migration networks.
1  To our understanding, the network effect occurs mainly through 
information sharing within and across social groups, while the peer effect is due to both 
information sharing and behavior assimilation within group members. In fact, in rural China, 
villagers form strong social and economic ties in their daily lives, so the behavior of a person 
would be affected by his or her village peers. Bauer et al. (2002) and Araujo et al. (2004) find 
strong evidence that peer effects exist in labor migration from rural Mexico to urban areas and 
from Mexico to the US, respectively. In our study, using data from rural China, we further 
confirm the existence of the peer effect in labor migration. In contrast to Araujo et al. (2004), 
we use regression parameters to simulate the equilibrium rate of migration in China and the 
effects of different policy instruments available in the model framework such as increasing 
human capital or promoting job information sharing. 
The peer effect is found in many social and economic behaviors, although the 
terminology differs according to research contexts (see Durlauf (2004) for an exhaustive 
literature survey). It is not a new idea that people are interdependent in decision making, but 
empirically constructing the peer group was once formidable because of the lack in subtle 
microdata. Therefore, the measurement of the peer effect is always at the core of research. 
Early research only roughly measured the peer effect as the average outcome in a group. For 
example, Evans et al. (1992) defined the class as the peer group and observed the effect of 
class average education scores on the probability of becoming an unmarried mother. Recent 
 
1 Bauer et al. (2002) use the terminology “herd effect” to demonstrate decision interdependence. We use the term 
“peer effect” in the same way. 5 
 
studies used unique data to identify friend networks and thus peer groups (Ballester et al., 
2006; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Patacchini and Zenou, 2008). Some even used the 
correspondence frequency to measure friendship distance (Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006). In 
our research, we assume people in the same village play with all the villagers, but each 
individual has a heterogeneous distance from the other villagers. Empirically, we construct the 
nonlinear peer effect using interaction terms between the peer effect and social interaction 
frequencies, our measure of social distance. Our work also endogenizes the social distance 
discussed in Zanella’s (2004) theoretical model, which will be shown in Section 3. 
Both the peer effect and social interaction frequency can be potentially endogenous. One 
source of endogeneity is the self-selection in group formation. A reference group may be 
formed by individuals who share similar characteristics; therefore, it is not the peer effect, but 
the group characteristics that affect one’s decision. If we do not consider the self-selection 
group formation, the peer effect would be overestimated. However, in our paper, we take the 
village as one’s reference group. The identity as a villager is exogenous and the self-selection 
problem is alleviated. Another endogeneity bias is associated with social interaction frequency, 
which could be a result of migration. To account for this, an instrumental variable for social 
interaction frequency is used in our study. 
In summary, our study contributes to the literature in three ways. With the out-of-village 
network effect controlled for, we first confirm the peer effect in decision making in rural–
urban migration in China. Second, we add an interaction term between social interaction 
strength and the peer effect to examine whether the peer effect is nonlinear. Meanwhile, we 
use the variable “historical family political identity in land reform” to instrument social 
interaction strengths. Third, we simulate the effects of policy measurements designed to 
promote rural–urban migration and discover that only through a “big push” in institutional 
change can we shift the low-migration equilibrium to a high-level one. 
 
3.  A Model of Social Interactions and Peer Effect 
Our model is mainly based on network models such as Ballester et al. (2006) and simplifies 
some of their assumptions. We contribute to those models by endogenizing the network 
connection, which is also termed “social distance” in Zanella (2004). 
There are N individuals in a village. The network N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of agents. 
The n-square matrix G of a network g keeps track of the connections in this network. Here, 
we simply assume each individual is friends with everybody else in network G. We borrow the standard peer effects model with the assumption  0 ij ik gg = ≠ . Ballester et al. (2006), Calvó-
Armengol and Zenou (2005), and Patacchini and Zenou (2008) discuss more general cases 
where individuals face different peer networks; however, we dismiss this idea because of the 
data limitation. Every person in our model has heterogeneous attitudes toward the behavior of 
peers, thus is a different social distance from the network. That is to say, in matrix G, gik≠ gjk 
if i j. It also implies that friendship is not a reciprocal relationship. We also set gii = 0.  ≠
Using matrix denotation: 
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.      (1) 
gi measures the social distance to the network. The standard peer effect model implies gi 
equals a constant; thus, gi cannot be estimated Here we write  i gJ s i i λ = + , with  , 0 i J λ > to 
capture the heterogeneous social distances of different individuals to other villagers. J is a 
constant, while   is the individual interaction frequency with other villagers. It is natural to 
assume that if one person is more involved in the local interaction, the peer effect will be 
larger. 
i s
Because more local interactions   will squeeze out the time that can be allocated to 
outward migration, we standardize   and   to be continuous and  , and simply 
assume: 
i s
i s i m , ii ms ] 1 , 0 [ ∈
1 ii sm + = ,        ( 2 )  
where 1 is the total time available for migration and social interaction. The utility that 
individual   obtains from outward migration is:  i
2
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with   and  .   , , 0 acd> 0 i b >
Inserting equations (1) and (2) into (3) we obtain: 
2 () [ ( 1 ) ] ii i i i i i Um a b m c m d mJ m m λ =+ − + + − .    (4) 
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 An individual optimizes the time allocated to outward migration work (First order condition): 
() 2 [ 2 ]0 (,) ii i i i i i dU m dm b cm dm J m G m m λ λ =− + +− == .  (5) 
The following second-order condition guarantees an interior solution: 
(,) 2 2 0 ii i Gm m m c d m λ ∂∂ = − − < ,     (6) 
(,) 2 ii Gm m m d J d d m i i λ λ ∂∂ = + − .     (7) 
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 is the core concept in our paper: the peer effect. Here, it can be decomposed into 







 corresponds to the standard linear term in the peer effect, and we can 
see that when the village migration ratio increases, the individual allocates more time to 










  represents the positive effect of social interaction on the peer 











<  is the third part and it shows that when individual i spends more time 
in outward migration, the effect of peer behavior decreases. The intuition behind this is that 
when one spends more time in social interaction, the time constraint on outward migration is 
more stringent. In summary, equation (8) can lead to two hypotheses: (1) individual migration 
time is positively related to group mean migration time; and (2) combining terms 2 and 3, 
social interaction can have either positive or negative effects on the peer effect, depending on 
the type and frequency of social interaction. Here, “type” means whether social interaction 
greatly reduces outward migration time. Equation (8) also predicts that social interaction 
frequency is determined simultaneously with migration, because migration time appears on 
both sides of the equation. This endogeneity problem will be treated using an instrumental 
variable in our study. 
 
4.  Data Description 
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The data used in our research are from the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project Survey 
(CHIP 2002) collected by the Chinese Academy of Social Science. Survey data are from 121 
counties, 961 administrative villages, 9,200 households and 37,969 individuals. The sampling 8 
 
                                                       
frame for the survey is a subsample of the official rural household survey conducted by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
2 The questionnaires were collected in February 2003, the 
Chinese Lunar New Year when almost all the Chinese including rural migrants return home 
and celebrated the spring festival together. Therefore, the survey captures information of all 
members of rural households including outward migrants. The data contain individual 
information, such as sex, age, education, job status, family information such as family 
structure, family economic condition and village geography, village population and economic 
conditions. More importantly, it also includes information on family social interactions with 
other villagers. 
The explained variable “migrants or not” is a 0–1 dummy variable. Defining the 
migration variable as discrete makes identification possible in the presence of the reflection 
problem. The reflection problem coined by Manski (1993) is a difficulty in estimating the 
peer effect. Simply speaking, in a linear model, individual characteristics affect one’s decision 
linearly. The average characteristics and average choice (measurement of the peer effect) are 
perfectly collinear so that parameters cannot be identified if we control them simultaneously 
in the regression model. However, Brock and Durlauf (2001) prove that the reflection 
problem can be avoided in the nonlinear model. Personal characteristics influence the choice 
nonlinearly in a nonlinear model such as probit or logit, so that they are not linearly correlated 
if we put them together in the regression model. In our paper, we define the explained variable 
“migration” as a 0–1 dummy variable, so that the reflection problem is avoided. 
In CHIP2002, individuals reported the days away from their family in a year. Because of 
the data limitation, we consider the urban areas in China as the only migration destination in 
our paper and do not differentiate between migration locations. We follow Zhao (2003) and 
define an individual as a migrant if he or she lives away from home more than 180 days in a 
year. Obviously, leaving family for more than six months in a year does not necessarily mean 
a person is a migrant. Therefore, we dropped all long-term out-of-village students, as well as 
the nonfarm employees who work in the township enterprise outside the village, because we 
have personal job status information. The largest change in our sample is that we only include 
the working-age population, i.e., observations of male individuals aged 16–60 and females 
aged 16–55 according to the official definition in China. We also drop observations whose 
 
2 The stratified sampling of the NBS rural household survey followed two steps. First, sample administrative 
villages were directly selected in each province according to income level, and second, sample households 
(generally 10) were chosen from each sample village. For details of the sampling framework and sampling 
method of the CHIP 2002 survey, see Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008). 
 important variables are missing. Finally, we have 16,401 observations. 
From the CHIP2002 questionnaire data, we obtain information on the village population 
and village migrant numbers. We calculate the village migration ratio using the following 
equation: 
population family  - population   village
migrants family    of   no.   - migrants   village   of   no.
ratio   migration   village = .   (9) 
This is the measure of village peer behavior in our paper. Peer influence should not contain 
the effects from one’s own family, so one’s own family is excluded from the village migration 
ratio. Another advantage of this is that we can have variances in “village migration ratio” 
among different households. This definition is close to the one used in Zhao (2003), who used 
the absolute number of migrants in a village to measure the network effects of migration. 
From her definition, we can interpret the migrant as an information source. When adding one 
migrant to the village, she will bring one job opportunity to the village. In contrast to Zhao 
(2003), we use the number of friends and relatives outside the village as a control variable of 
the household network, and the migration ratio of village peers to capture peer effects. The 
interpretation of this variable is how the villagers respond to the increase in the village 
migration ratio. It mainly captures the decision dependence among the villagers. Intuitively, 
when two villages have the same number of migrants but a huge difference in total population, 
the residents in the high migration ratio village are more inclined to participate in outward 
migration because of peer behavior assimilation. 
Social interactions between one’s family and other villagers are another group of focus 
variables in our study. Here, we categorize the social interactions into three types: interactions 
in labor markets, in information sharing and in financial markets. In Chinese rural areas, the 
market for labor services is still so unfledged that rural residents cooperate a lot in labor-
sharing activities. The enlarging rural–urban income gap makes outward migration an 
effective way of income earning, so rural residents also exchange job information. Moreover, 
mutual borrowing and lending are a substitute for missing formal financial services in rural 
areas. In the CHIP2002 data, a series of questions record the social interaction strengths of a 
family with their relatives and neighbors, such as “mutual help during busy seasons”, “labor 
exchange in house building”, “taking care of old persons, sick persons, and babies”, 
“exchange information on employment”, and “borrowing money”. The answers to these 
questions are discrete: (1) very frequently, (2) often, (3) just so-so, (4) sometimes, and (5) 
none/few. We categorize “mutual help during busy seasons”, “labor exchange in house 
building”, and “taking care of old persons, sick persons, and babies” as the social interactions 
9 
 in the labor market. “Exchange information on employment” is obviously an interaction in 
information sharing, and “borrowing money” is an interaction in financial markets. We 
transform each question into a group of four dummy variables with the baseline being 
“none/few”. On that basis, we interact the social interaction dummies with the village 
migration ratio (peer effect), and use the interaction terms to capture the nonlinear peer 
effect.
3 
All the explanatory variables are listed in Table 1, and the basic statistical descriptions 
are in Table 2. We can see from Table 2 that among the 16,401 rural laborers, 2,675 
individuals participated in outward migration in 2002, which indicates an overall migration 
ratio of 16.31%. Even in the basic statistics, we can see some differences between migrants 
and nonmigrants. Fewer women are employed in outward migration, and in the migrants 
sample, 50.24% individuals are unmarried, compared with 25.21% in the nonmigrants sample. 
The outward migrants are much younger with an average age of 27.1, lower than the 36.1 
years in the nonmigrants’ sample. All these explanatory variables are controlled for in our 
regression model. However, in the regression analysis, we focus on the magnitude and 
direction of the peer effect and the interaction term between social interaction strength and the 
peer effect. 
 
5.  Regression Model and Result 
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Here Mi represents the migration decision, and equals one if the utility from migration is 
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The marginal effect of the peer effect is  Pr( 1) ii i M Mg ′ ∂ =∂= Φ ⋅ , where  ii gJ s i λ =+ . 
We establish the following probit model to explore the determinants of outward 
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3 We get a total of 5 × 4 = 20 interaction terms. 11 
 
migration: 
(1 ) ( ijk ijk jk jk st jkst PY X J M M s βλ == Φ + + × ) ∑ .   (13) 
Equation (10) is the determination function of outward migration probability. i , j  and  k  
represent the individual, family and village, respectively.  ijk X  is a vector of individual, family 
and village characteristics variables.  jk M  is the village m tion ratio (excluding one’s own 
family) and it is the measurement of the peer effect that we are mostly concerned with in our 
paper.  jkst s   are the dummies of social interactions of a family with their relatives and 
neighbors, where subscript s  denotes s kinds of social interaction and t  is the interaction 
strength. If we do not control for unobservable village characteristics, the parameters are 
potentially biased. In our regression, we follow Ding and Lehrer (2007) and control the 
lagged village migration ratio in 1998 to control for unobservable village characteristics. 
Meanwhile, in the robustness check, we alternatively control the county dummies to see the 
validity of coefficients. 
The regression resu
igra




action terms in the regression and also control for the lagged village migration ratio. We 
can see from the regression that the coefficient of the peer effect is positive and significant at 
the 1% level as expected. However, coefficients of interaction terms appear to be divergent: 
stronger social interactions in labor markets reduce the positive role of the peer effect; by 
contrast, more interactions in job market information sharing enhance the peer effect. 
Interactions in financial markets are somehow irrelevant to the role of the peer effect. 
To check the robustness of the results, we report different functional form regres
e 4. In columns 1 and 2, we control the county dummy instead of the lagged village 
migration ratio. The distinction is that in column 1 we do not control all the interaction terms 
that are all included in column 2. The results show that the direction and significance of the 
peer effect do not change much. In columns 3 to 7, we still control the lagged village 
migration ratio, but in each regression, we include only one group of interaction terms. From 
the regression results we can see that in the “exchange information on employment” 
regression, the magnitude of the peer effect falls significantly, but more interactions in 
information sharing enhance the peer effect. To check the robustness of whether labor market 
interactions diminish the effect of peers, we utilize the data in CHIP2002 that records the 
exact number of days of mutual help in year 2002. Column 8 shows that more interactions in 
the labor market decrease the magnitude of the peer effect. All of the above checks confirm 12 
 
probit regression does not represent the true marginal effects of 
that 




Table 3, we can see that the effects of 
the 
the robustness of the regression results in Table 3, so we analyze and interpret the result based 
on the parameters in Table 3. 
The parameter from the 
variable. However, when Stata is calculating the marginal effects, it treats the interaction 
term as an independent variable, so Ai and Norton (2003) point out that almost all previous 
empirical studies have incorrectly estimated the marginal effect of the interaction term. In our 
paper, we have 20 interaction terms and they are all interacted with the peer effect. If we do 
not correctly calculate the marginal effects of these interaction terms, our interpretation of the 
peer effect will also be incorrect. We show how to calculate and interpret the marginal effects 
of the interaction terms in Appendix 1. The marginal effects of parameters are reported in 
column 2 of Table 3. 
What we are prim
percentage increase in the village migration ratio increases the individual probability of 
outward migration by 0.124%. This is termed a “social multiplier” in the literature (Glaeser et 
al., 2003). This result has confirmed the existence of the peer effect in the outward migration 
decision in rural China. However, the positive relationship between the village migration ratio 
and individual migration probability also indicates the potential danger of outward migration: 
if village peers are less inclined to migrate because of institutional obstacles such as urban–
rural segmentation in China, the negative effects will also be amplified by the social multiplier.
Is the peer effect nonlinear? We know that the role of the peer effect stems from 
action with peers. Intuitively, if one’s family is reluctant to interact with other villagers, 
they will be more separated from their neighborhood and less influenced by village peers. 
Being guided by this interpretation, we include the interaction terms of social interaction 
strength and the peer effect to observe the nonlinearity. 
Our empirical findings are very interesting. From 
interaction terms differ among the different social interaction categories. First of all, 
people who are more willing to share job opportunity information will have a stronger 
information advantage from social interaction and they are more likely to assimilate with their 
village peers in the outward migration decision. Interaction in the labor market is the second 
kind of social interaction we are concerned with. From column 2 in Table 3, we can see that 
the interaction term of “mutual help during busy season—very frequently” is significantly 
negative at the 10% level. “Mutual help during busy season—often and just so-so” are 
insignificant although the coefficients are negative. The coefficient of “mutual help during 
busy season—sometimes” is positive and significant at the 5% level. All the four interaction 13 
 
plications. Labor market 
inter
inancial market interactions on the peer effect. However, 
no e
nt with the findings in previous studies.  
terms for “labor exchange in house building” with the peer effect are significantly negative 
and only the interaction term of the peer effect with “taking care of old persons, sick persons, 
and babies—sometimes” is significantly negative at the 5% level. 
The negative sign of the interaction terms has rich im
actions can have dual effects. On the one hand, they can serve as a way to shorten the 
social distance between peers and can lead to more binding relationships with peers. On the 
other hand, labor market interactions can also make the individual’s time constraint more 
binding. In other words, more interaction in the labor market will increase potential migration 
time more because of the weaker role of the peer effect. Our findings have supported the 
above interpretation. When mutual help in the busy season occurs “sometimes”, the time 
constraint is less tight, so social interaction can enhance the role of the peer effect. If we 
increase the interaction strength to higher levels, the time constraint would be more binding, 
so the coefficients become negative but insignificant and then eventually significantly 
negative. In the other two labor market interactions, “labor exchange in house building” and 
“taking care of old persons, sick persons, and babies”, the time constraint mechanism is more 
important, so the coefficients are always negative, only differing in significance level. This is 
understandable, because “labor exchange in house building” and “taking care of old persons, 
sick persons, and babies” are long-term and time-consuming activities while “mutual help 
during busy season” is merely a short-term one. The fact that within-community social 
interaction may play a negative role in labor migration has previously been neglected in the 
literature except by Narayan (1999) and Alesina and Giuliano (2007). Narayan (1999) 
separates social capital into within-community “bonding” social capital and between-
community “bridging” social capital. He argues that if a community has higher bonding social 
capital, it will have higher internal welfare, but they will also lose many outside job 
opportunities. Alesina and Giuliano (2007) find that stronger family ties can decrease the 
geographical mobility of individuals. However, social interactions in the labor market are 
perhaps the spontaneous substitutes of an unfledged labor service market in the rural areas. 
Therefore, we can expect that with the development of the economy, more and more emerging 
labor market services will decrease the interactions of rural residents in the labor exchange, 
thus promoting outward migration. 
We also explore the effect of f
vidence has shown that financial interaction matters for the peer effect. It seems that the 
two processes are mutually independent. 




he migration decision. For an 
addi
(1) Individual characteristics will significantly affect the migration decision. W
inclined to migrate, with a probability that is 4.36% lower than males. Marriage will 
greatly decrease the probability of outward migration by 11.96%. Age has an inverse U-
shaped relationship with the migration probability. A laborer has a maximum migration 
probability at the age of 31, and beyond this age the marginal effect of age is negative. All 
these findings are consistent with existing empirical results. Zhao (2003) finds that all levels 
of education are insignificant in migration determination, which is in contrast to our result 
that education levels are all significantly positive with illiteracy as the reference point. 
However, the influence of education is nonlinear; villagers who receive a junior high school 
education have the highest probability of migration, 7.17% higher than the illiterate group, 
while villagers with a primary education have the second-highest probability of migration, 
5.33% higher. If a person has a higher education level, the probability of outward migration is 
moderately higher than the illiterate group. The probability of migration for villagers with a 
technical school education or higher is 4.63% higher and for senior high school education is 
4.82% higher. Our findings seemingly imply that higher education for the rural residents may 
be at the expense of a lower outward migration probability. For the policy makers, there may 
exist some “optimal” education level for the purpose of rural–urban migration. However, we 
need to be cautious about this conclusion: one possible explanation for the nonlinear 
“education return” is that the higher education receivers have permanently stayed in the city 
areas after gaining their urban Hukou (residence registration), so that they are not included as 
“migrants” in the rural sample. Another explanation is that better-educated workers are more 
likely to participate in local nonfarm employment (Zhao, 1999a, 1999b; Liang and White, 
1997), which is included as nonmigration in our regression.  
(2) Family characteristics also significantly affect t
tional laborer in a family, the individual probability of migration increases by 3.98%. 
Meanwhile, if a family has more arable land, the probability of outward migration declines 
because of the labor substitution between local farming and migration work. The family 
structure can also influence the individual migration decision. Families that have one 
additional child aged between six and 12 have a 0.99% lower migration probability. One 
additional older person does not significantly influence the migration decision because they 
can be either an effective laborer in the household or a person to be taken care of in rural 
China. The household social network can also promote labor migration. If one’s family has 
social ties outside the village or has kin as village cadre, the probability of outward migration 
increases by 1.17% and 1.06%, respectively.  15 
 
so matter. An increase of village income by 100 
RMB
.  Historical Class Identity and Social Interaction: An IV Estimation 
hinese 
mportantly, we are concerned with the endogeneity bias associated with social 
inter
(3) Village geographical characteristics al
 yuan increases the opportunity costs of migration and decreases the individual 
migration probability by 1.01%. People living in the mountainous and hilly areas have a 
higher probability of migration. These two dummies may have captured unobserved poor 
living conditions regardless of village income. The distance from a village to the county seat 




In our study, because the survey was conducted in February 2003, which was the C
Lunar New Year and people always go back to their families for reunion, the data avoid 
sample selection bias to a great extent. At the same time, we use administrative villages as the 
focus of our analysis. The formation of village and villager identities is largely exogenous to 
the individual; thus we also alleviate self-selection of the reference group. Although there may 
still exist bias in the omission of village characteristics, we attempt to control for the effect of 
village characteristics by controlling the lagged village migration ratio in 1998, which is used 
to absorb the unobserved fixed effect of village, historical information and other features of 
the village. 
More i
action strength among villagers. The unobservable features of the family and village may 
influence the frequency of social interactions, leading to missing variable bias. The strength of 
social interactions may not be the cause of migration but the outcome that results in 
simultaneity bias. Instrumental variables can be used to achieve efficient estimation. However, 
the problem is that because we decompose these qualitative variables of social interaction into 
four dummies for each of the five groups in our research, it is impossible to find enough 
instrumental variables. Our strategy is as follows. First, we change the measurement of 
household social interaction into a continuous variable. This method is obviously problematic 
because the value of these variables only represents the relative change, not the change in 
absolute value. However, it does not impair the robustness of the result. The results in column 
1 in Table 5 show that it makes no significant difference in terms of either the coefficient sign 
or the significance level when using a continuous measurement of household social 
interaction and interacting it with the peer effect. The signs of the interaction terms of labor 
market interactions, such as “mutual help during busy season”, “labor exchange in house 16 
 
s do not change when we 
inclu
building” and “taking care of old persons, sick persons, and babies”, are still negative and are 
different from zero at the 5% significance level. That is to say, families that have a higher 
level of social interaction in the labor market have a weaker peer effect. The coefficient of the 
interaction term of information exchange is positive. For the interaction term of “borrowing 
money”, the result is still insignificant. These results are consistent with our previous findings. 
We separately put these interaction terms into the regression, and the results are listed in 
columns 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Table 5). In these results, the interaction term for “borrowing 
money” is significant at the 10% level. Our other results are still consistent with previous 
regression results in terms of coefficient signs and significances. 
Because the signs and significances of the interaction term
de them all in the same regression, we use this functional form and use “historical family 
political identity in land reform” as an instrument for social interaction strength. In the early 
days after the founding of the P. R. China, to consolidate fragile state finances and eliminate 
the “counterrevolutionary forces” hidden in rural areas, Chairman Mao Zedong initiated the 
Movement of Land Reform in rural areas (from the end of the 1940s to the early 1950s). The 
families in rural areas were labeled with different political identities, “landlord”, “rich 
peasant”, “rich-middle peasant”, “lower-middle peasant” and “poor peasant or landless”, 
according to their economic status and the acres of household land. At the same time, the 
private lands and properties of the “rich peasants” and “landlords” were redistributed to the 
“lower-middle peasant” and “poor peasant or landless” who had no or only small land 
ownership. As a result, the once “lower-middle peasant” and “poor peasant or landless” who 
were at the bottom of the rural society jumped to the top in the reversal of political status, 
while the “landlords” and “rich peasants” were deprived of their previous political and 
economic power, and were labeled as “black class”. These lifetime-accompanying political 
identities were important criteria to judge someone in a job, marriage and many other aspects 
of social life. In our research, we generate a dummy for the family head’s father’s political 
identity in land reform. The dummy given to “lower-middle peasant” and “poor peasant or 
landless” is 0 and 1 otherwise. In politics, “rich-middle peasant” is the class to be combined 
with “lower-middle peasant” and “poor peasant or landless”, but it did not belong to “red 
class”. Sato and Li (2007) study the class identities’ role in intergenerational education 
attainment. Although they have distinguished “middle-rich peasant” from “rich peasant” and 
“landlords”, and use two dummies to control them separately, they discovered that the 
interaction terms of these political identities and Maoist era are significantly negative. That is 
to say, during Mao’s time both of them had a negative effect, so we group “middle-rich 17 
 
Rivers and Vuong (1988). We 
can 
7.  Peer Effect and Public Policy 
eer effect exists in rural China’s labor migration. 
peasant” into the same class as “landlords” and “rich peasants”. We believe that, their families 
being classified as middle-rich, rich peasants and landlords were discriminated against in 
politics, their social lives and other public services such as education, until the reform and 
opening up of China. During that long period, families with low political status suffered social 
separation and retaliation, so these families would reduce their interaction with other peasants. 
These reductions came not only from subjective motivation but also from social pressure in 
rural society. Past interaction frequency will influence current household interactions with 
other villagers. Furthermore, we also argue that the father’s political identity following the 
land reform movement does not influence the individual’s current decision regarding outward 
migration. Indirect evidence is that Sato and Li (2007) discover that distributions of different 
political identities are nearly the same between migrants and nonmigrants. Thus, we are safe 
to use “historical family political identity in land reform” as the instrument for social 
interaction strength. We report our regression results in Table 6. 
We use a two-step probit regression that was introduced by 
see from the first stage regression, except “borrowing money from each other”, that the 
other social interaction variables are strongly negatively influenced by the instrument. For the 
“mutual help during busy season”, the instrumental variable is significant at the 10% level, 
while for other social interactions, the instrumental variable is significant at the 1% level. The 
R
2 of the first-stage regression is around 0.67–0.68 for different social interactions. These 
results validate our assumption that the middle and rich peasants and landlords who suffered 
past discrimination reduced household current social interaction with other villagers. However, 
for the results of the second stage, in all regressions using instrumental variables, the Wald 
exogeneity test shows that the hypothesis that the probit and ivprobit results are not 
significantly different is not rejected. Therefore, we still use the result in Table 3. 
 
Our empirical results show that the p
Furthermore, the peer effect is nonlinear. More interaction in the labor market reduces the 
strength of the peer effect, while information sharing enhances the peer effect. The existence 
of a nonlinear peer effect has rich implication for policy makers. Theoretically, the peer effect 
will lead to multiple equilibria in the economic process. When the mean group behavior 
outcome is at a low level, the economic process may converge to a low-level equilibrium 
because of interdependences in decision making; however, when the mean group behavior 18 
 
beneficial to rural residents, but 
also 
is to move the response curve by changing individual 
char
outcome exceeds some threshold, the economic process will converge to a high-level 
equilibrium with social interaction (Zanella, 2004). In the context of our paper, China’s 
urbanization would be dampened if there was a low-level equilibrium in rural–urban labor 
migration. We use the regression parameters in Table 3 to simulate the equilibrium condition 
in the labor migration decision. Figure 1 reflects the relationship between the village 
migration ratio and the mean individual migration probability. The horizontal axis represents 
the village migration ratio and the vertical axis represents the mean individual migration 
probability. The solid line is the 45 degree line. The dash-dot line, the individual response 
curve, shows the relationship between individual migration probability and village migration 
ratio. Here we have only one point of intersection between the individual migration 
probability curve and the 45 degree line, with a slope less than one that guarantees a stable 
equilibrium with an average village migration ratio of 8.45%. As the pdf (probability density 
function) of the probit model is a standard normal distribution and its cumulative distribution 
function is assumed to be S-shaped, the low-level and high-level equilibriums can be 
differentiated according to the intersection point between the 45 degree line and the response 
curve. If the intersection point lies below 50% of the village migration ratio, the equilibrium 
is a low-level one. In contrast, if it is above 50%, the equilibrium is high level and stable, 
meaning that any departure within a limited range from the equilibrium will converge to the 
high equilibrium during dynamic adjustment. From Figure 1, we see that the intersection of 
the response curve and 45 degree line lies in the lower half of the S curve. That is to say, with 
the coefficients of the model unchanged, even if an exogenous shock increases the village 
migration ratio along the response curve, the labor migration ratio still converges to the low-
level equilibrium trap under the influence of the peer effect. 
Promoting rural-to-urban labor migration is not only 
to China’s economic growth. Thus, our policy design aims to promote labor migration 
from rural to urban areas. In the following policy analysis, we distinguish policies at three 
levels and simulate their effects. 
The first kind of policy 
acteristics such as education level. This policy can increase the migration probability but 
has no impact on social interaction among villagers, and thus does not change the slope of the 
response curve. Among the variables controlled, only the education level can be largely 
improved through economic policy. In Figure 2, we assume that policies are to improve the 
education of the villagers so that all villagers that are illiterate or have a primary school 
education can have the compulsory junior high school education. From the regression, we 19 
 
 is to increase the social interaction that contributes to the peer effect 
and 
hat by altering 
simu
tio equilibrium is to allow an enlarging of the 
urba
have already learned that the enhancement of rural residents’ education will increase the 
probability of outward migration. Figure 2 again shows this result. We find that the individual 
migration probability curve moves upwards and intersects with the 45 degree line at a higher 
point where the village migration ratio equals 9.35%. However, it should be noted that the 
effect of the policy is still limited and the point of intersection resumes the characteristics of a 
low-level equilibrium. 
The second policy
decrease the social interaction that reduces the peer effect. Graphically, this means 
rotating the curve anticlockwise while holding the intercept of the response curve constant. 
Figure 3 shows clearly this case. If we create policies to encourage more extensive 
interactions among villagers about job information (define the state of “exchange information 
on employment” as “very frequently”) and at the same time establish a rural labor service 
market to decrease the interactions on the labor market (we define the state of three 
dimensions of labor interactions strength as “none/few”, the reference group in the regression 
specifications), we may find a significant increase in the slope of the migration curve and a 
higher point of intersection on the 45 degree curve with a corresponding village migration 
ratio of 12.44%. In addition, we observe from Figure 3 that the individual migration 
probability curve is S shaped; however, the equilibrium is still at a low level. 
What if we combine the above two policies? Figure 4 shows t
ltaneously the villagers’ education and their social interactions strength, the combined 
policy will increase the migration ratio in equilibrium with a corresponding village migration 
ratio of 14.57%. However, the labor migration equilibrium is still at a low level even if the 
two policies are implemented together. In other words, new policies should be found to escape 
the low-level equilibrium of labor migration. 
One way to retain the low migration ra
n–rural income gap. When the income gap increases continuously, the response curve 
shifts upward until the intersection becomes a high-level equilibrium. However, the 
increasingly widened income gap between rural and urban areas is never costless. The urban–
rural income gap in China is already very large and the widening of the income gap will 
threaten economic growth (Wan et al., 2006). To facilitate the transition from a low-level 
equilibrium of migration to a high-level one, a more important approach is the integration of 
the urban and rural labor markets through institutional reform, which is also the third kind of 
policy we could propose to increase labor migration within our analytical framework. 
Graphically, the policy will further heighten the intercept of the response curve. Although the 20 
 
.  Conclusion 
ested the existence and influence of the peer effect on the labor migration 
. We calculate the labor migration 
equi
                                                       
current migration decision from rural to urban areas is in fact basically a free decision process, 
the existence of urban–rural segmentation and urban-biased economic policy still exerts 
extensive discrimination against rural migrants and labor migration is constrained (Chen and 
Lu, 2008).
4 If we could eliminate this kind of urban-biased economic policy and promote 
rural–urban social integration, then the expected return of outward migration and thus the 
probability of outward migration would increase. In Figure 5, we conduct a simulation and 
increase the intercept from –4.6432 to –4.4399, that is, an increase of 0.2033 in absolute value. 
Combined with the improvement in the rural education level and social interaction, this leads 
to an equilibrium migration ratio of 50%, which is obviously the threshold point of having a 
high-level equilibrium of labor migration. If the high-level equilibrium appears in the figure, 
by relying on the peer effect and social multiplier, a small-scale positive impact to increase 
the labor mobility can result in the migration ratio converging to an even higher equilibrium. 
For the transition from a low-level equilibrium to a high-level one, a “big push” in the 
institutional environment is needed. Policies toward education must be more economic in 
nature and those targeting the strength of social interaction must be more social in nature, and 
then the institutional reform will indeed bear more political characteristics. 
 
8
In this paper, we t
decision. Our empirical results suggest the following conclusions. (1) The peer effect exists in 
migration decision making. (2) The magnitude of the peer effect is nonlinear. Families who 
are more frequently involved in information sharing can enhance the peer effect, while more 
interactions in the labor market will reduce the positive effects of peers. Interactions in the 
financial market do not affect the peer effect. At the same time, we use the instrumental 
variable method to test whether household endogeneity bias exists. We utilize the “historical 
family political identity in land reform” as the instrument for social interactions. The ivprobit 
regression results do not show significant difference compared with the probit results. These 
findings enrich our understanding of social capital. Labor market interactions diminish the 
probability of outward migration through the peer effect. 
These findings have important policy implications
librium, which results in a low-level equilibrium. Through the policies of increasing 
 
4 In urban areas of China, multiple discrimination policies still exist for rural migrants, for example, management 
fees collected from rural migrants, lower wages, discrimination in social security, labor protection and education, 
and even compensation for accidental death. 21 
 
eer effect provide a new explanation for the 
prev
education and enhancing the peer effect, we can increase the labor migration ratio. However, 
neither of these two policies can shift the low-level equilibrium to a high-level one, even if we 
combine the two. Only through institutional reform, i.e., the elimination of rural–urban labor 
market segregation policy and promoting social integration, can we change the low-level 
labor migration equilibrium to a high-level one. 
More generally, our findings regarding the p
iously unexplained phenomenon in urbanization in the world. From a cross-sectional 
viewpoint, under population mobility control, China has a low urbanization ratio, only 43.9% 
at the end of 2006, while some other developing countries appear to have a high level of 
urbanization given their low degree of industrialization. For example, the urbanization ratio of 
Brazil in 2003 was 82.9%, and the urbanization ratio exceeds 70% in Africa. Longitudinally, 
when a country is experiencing rapid industrialization, urbanization accelerates and only 20–
30 years are needed to complete the S-shaped process (Northam, 1975). If we consider the 
role of the peer effect in labor migration, when the mean migration ratio is low, people are 
more inclined to stay because of decision interdependence, and the migration ratio will 
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 Appendix 1: The Marginal Effects of the Probit Model with Interaction Terms 
 
We use the following regression model to derive the marginal effect of the probit model with interaction 
terms: 
(1 ) ( ijk ijk jk jk st jkst PY X J M M s β == Φ + + × ) λ ∑ .    (14) 
Here s denotes the category of social interaction, s = 1,…,5, t represents the interaction strength, j = 1,…,4. 
Therefore,  st λ is a 12 vector. We derive P with respect to M and get:  0 ×
(1 ) * ( ) stj k s t PY M J s λ ′ ∂= ∂ = Φ + ∑ ,      ( 1 5 )  
where 
( ijk jk jk st jkst) X JM M s β ′′ Φ= Φ + + × λ ∑ .    (16) 
When all the variables are evaluated at their mean, we obtain the “average” marginal effect of the peer 
effect. Sjkst are dummy variables; we have five groups and each group has five statuses of social interactions, 
therefore, a total of 5
5 = 3125 marginal effects. It is too complicated to report them in the paper so we 
follow another approximate routine. First, we control all the social interactions in the baseline (none/few) 
and then pick out one group and calculate the marginal effect from the changing of only one social 
interaction strength. So we only need to report 5 × 5 = 25 marginal effects, and the nonlinearity of the peer 
effect can be considered by changing from the baseline to a specific social interaction strength. To be more 
specific, we take (0,0,0,0,0) as the baseline and from (15) and (16) we obtain the partial effect for the 
baseline model as  () * X JM J β ′ Φ+ . We define it as the baseline marginal effect of the peer effect that is 
reported in the footnote of Table 3. 
Every partial effect can be expressed as the departure from the baseline: 
[1, ,5], [1, ,4] [1, ,5], 0 (1 ) | (1 ) | s ts PY M PY M ∈∈ ∈ ∂= ∂ − ∂= ∂      t =  
() * ( ) ( st st ) * X JM M J X JM J βλ λ β ′ =Φ + + + −Φ + ′ .      (17) 
This is the marginal effect of each interaction term compared with the baseline. We report them in 









Table 1: The Variable Definition  
Peer effect  village migration ratio  village migration ratio (excluding one’s own family) in 2002 
female  dummy variable, female=1 
age age 
married dummy,  married=1 
primary school  dummy, if education is primary school, primary school=1 
junior high school  dummy, if education is junior high school, junior high school =1 
senior high school  dummy, if education is senior high school, senior high school =1 
tech school or more  dummy, if education is technical school or college education, tech school or 
more =1 
communist  dummy, if respondent is communist party member, communist =1 
health very good  dummy, if health is very good, health very good =1 
health good  dummy, if health is good, health good =1 









health bad  dummy, if health is bad, health bad =1 
household labor force  the number of labor force of a family 
family per capita land  family per capita land 
kids no. under 6  the number of children under age six of a family 
kids no. between 6 and 12  the number of children aging between six and twelve of a family 
elder no. over 65  the number of elders over age 65 of a family 
friends or relatives 
outside 








friends or relatives village 
cadre 
dummy, if a family has friends and relatives as village cadre, friends or relatives 
village cadre =1 
village mig ratio 1998  village migration ratio in 1998 
distance to nearest 
transportation terminal 
the distance from village to a nearest transportation terminal, unit: kilometers 
distance to the country 
seat 
the distance from village to the county seat, unit: kilometers 
village per capita income  village per capita income, unit: hundred Yuan 






hill area  dummy, if a village locates in the hill area, hill area =1 
info very frequently  dummy, if “exchange information of employment” is “very frequently””, 
information very frequently =1 
info often  dummy, if “exchange information of employment” is “often”, information often 
=1 
info just so so  dummy, if “exchange information of employment” is “just so so”, information 
just so so =1 
info sometimes  dummy, if “exchange information of employment” is “sometimes”, information 
sometimes =1 
borrow very frequently  dummy, if “borrowing money” is “very frequently”, borrow very frequently =1 
borrow often  dummy, if “borrowing money” is “often”, borrow often =1 
borrow just so so  dummy, if “borrowing money” is “just so so”, borrow just so so =1 
borrow sometimes  dummy, if “borrowing money” is “sometimes”, borrow sometimes =1 
help very frequently  dummy, if "mutual-help during busy season” is “very frequently”, help very 
frequently =1  
help often  dummy, if "mutual-help during busy season” is “often”, help often =1 
help just so so  dummy, if "mutual-help during busy season” is “just so so”, help just so so =1 
help sometimes  dummy, if "mutual-help during busy season” is “sometimes”, help sometimes =1
housing very frequently  dummy, if "labor exchange in house-building" is “very frequently”, housing very 
frequently =1 
housing often   dummy, if "labor exchange in house-building" is “often”, housing often =1 
housing just so so  dummy, if "labor exchange in house-building" is “just so so”, housing just so so 
=1 
housing sometimes  dummy, if "labor exchange in house-building" is “sometimes”, housing 
sometimes =1 
care very frequently  dummy, if "taking care of old person, sick person, and babies" is “very 
frequently”, care very frequently =1 
care often  dummy, if "taking care of old person, sick person, and babies" is “often”, care 
often =1 
care just so so  dummy, if "taking care of old person, sick person, and babies" is “just so so”, 


















care sometimes  dummy, if "taking care of old person, sick person, and babies" is “sometimes”, 




Table 2: Statistical Description of Variables 
 Full  sample  Migrants  Non-migrants 
 16401  2675  13726 
Variable  Mean s.  d. Mean s.  d. Mean s.  d. 
Individual Characteristics:        
female 0.4459  0.4971  0.3727 0.4836 0.4602 0.4984 
age  34.6344 12.4495 27.1166 8.34829  36.09952  12.5880 
married 0.6993  0.4586  0.4501 0.4976 0.7479 0.4343 
primary  school  0.2649 0.4413 0.1806 0.3847 0.2813 0.4496 
junior high school  0.5033 0.5000 0.6191 0.4857 0.4807 0.4996 
senior high school  0.1321 0.3386 0.1140 0.3179 0.1356 0.3424 
tech school or more  0.0659 0.2481 0.0789 0.2696 0.0634 0.2437 
communist 0.0710  0.2568  0.0303 0.1714 0.0789 0.2696 
health  very  good  0.2408 0.4276 0.2834 0.4507 0.2325 0.4224 
health  good  0.6281 0.4833 0.6624 0.4730 0.6214 0.4851 
health  so  so  0.0983 0.2978 0.0422 0.2012 0.1093 0.3120 
health  bad  0.0253 0.1571 0.0093 0.0962 0.0284 0.1662 
Family Characteristics:        
household labor force  2.7678 1.2718 3.3544 1.2583 2.6534 1.2427 
family per capita land  2.0937 2.3302 1.6258 1.7300 2.1849 2.4196 
kids no. under 6  0.1818  0.4285 0.2011 0.4534 0.1780 0.4234 
kids no. between 6 and 12  0.3354 0.6014 0.2819 0.5630 0.3458 0.6081 
elder people no. over 65  0.1806 0.4535 0.1966 0.4794 0.1775 0.4482 
friends or relatives outside  0.5726 0.4947 0.5922 0.4915 0.5688 0.4953 
friends or members village cadre  0.2240 0.4169 0.2456 0.4305 0.2198 0.4141 
Village Characteristics:        
distance to the country seat  25.2382 21.6849 27.1437 20.3367 24.8668 21.9194 
distance to nearest transportation
terminal  5.4653 8.3177 5.3916 7.9651 5.4797 8.3849 
village  per  capita  income  2.3886 1.3957 2.1802 1.1521 2.4292 1.4349 
village mig ratio 1998  0.0882 0.0786 0.1204 0.0814 0.0819 0.0764 
mountain  area  0.2187 0.4134 0.2426 0.4287 0.2140 0.4102 
hill  area  0.3436 0.4749 0.4426 0.4968 0.3243 0.4681 
Peer effect:        
village migration ratio  0.1703 0.1474 0.2297 0.1533 0.1588 0.1434 
Social Interaction Strength:        
info very frequently  0.0465 0.2106 0.0587 0.2351 0.0442 0.2054 
info  often  0.1722 0.3776 0.2213 0.4152 0.1627 0.3691 
info  just  so  so  0.2855 0.4517 0.2916 0.4546 0.2844 0.4511 
info  sometimes  0.2077 0.4057 0.2041 0.4031 0.2084 0.4062 
borrow very frequently  0.0546 0.2271 0.0557 0.2294 0.0543 0.2267 
borrow  often  0.2043 0.4032 0.2146 0.4106 0.2023 0.4017 
borrow  just  so  so  0.3539 0.4782 0.3555 0.4788 0.3536 0.4781 
borrow sometimes  0.2407  0.4275 0.2497 0.4329 0.2389 0.4264 
help very frequently  0.1138 0.3176 0.0983 0.2978 0.1169 0.3213 
help often   0.2198  0.4141 0.2329 0.4228 0.2173 0.4124 
help just so so  0.3057 0.4607 0.2662 0.4420 0.3134 0.4639 
help sometimes  0.1890  0.3915 0.2034 0.4026 0.1862 0.3893 
housing very frequently  0.1289 0.3351 0.1372 0.3441 0.1273 0.3333 
housing often   0.2647  0.4412 0.2632 0.4404 0.2650 0.4413 
housing just so so  0.2543 0.4355 0.2265 0.4187 0.2597 0.4385 
housing sometimes  0.1748  0.3798 0.1836 0.3872 0.1731 0.3783 
care very frequently  0.0434 0.2037 0.0434 0.2037 0.0433 0.2036 
care often   0.1172  0.3217  0.1133 0.3170 0.1180 0.3226 
care  just  so  so  0.2197 0.4140 0.1940 0.3955 0.2247 0.4174 








Table 3: Probit Regression Result (Discrete Social Interactions) 
Dependent Variable: Migrant or not (Migrant=1, Non-migrant=0) 
Variable  Coef.  Standard 
Error 
Marginal 




Peer effect               
village migration ratio  0.9437***  0.2142  0.1240        
Interactions of Peer effect with Social Distance         
mig ratio×info very frequently  1.3444***  0.2768  0.3605 mig ratio×help just so so  -0.1156  0.1663  -0.0241
mig ratio×info often  1.0975***  0.1822  0.2829 mig ratio×help sometimes  0.3640**  0.1744  0.0828 
mig ratio×info just so so  0.6296*** 
0.1663 





mig ratio×info sometimes  0.4208**  0.1731  0.0967 mig ratio×housing often  -0.7206***  0.1843  -0.1331
mig ratio×borrow very frequently  -0.3484  0.3161  -0.0693 mig ratio×housing just so so  -0.8320***  0.1808  -0.1503
mig ratio×borrow often  -0.0794  0.1999  -0.0166 mig ratio×housing sometimes -0.3045*  0.1854  -0.0611
mig ratio×borrow just so so  -0.0465  0.1842  -0.0098 mig ratio×care very frequently -0.3638  0.2927  -0.0722
mig ratio×borrow sometimes  -0.0058  0.1847  -0.0012 mig ratio×care often  -0.1947  0.2074  -0.0399
mig ratio×help very frequently   -0.4086*  0.2399  -0.0804 mig ratio×care just so so  -0.3052**  0.1551  -0.0612
mig ratio×help often  -0.0443  0.1780  -0.0094 mig ratio×care sometimes  -0.0611  0.1481  -0.0129
Individual, Household and Village Characteristics         
Married  -0.6018***  0.0492  -0.1196 kids no. under 6  -0.0483  0.0336  -0.0082
Age  0.1999***  0.0113  0.0037 kids no. between 6 and 12  -0.0583**  0.0249  -0.0099
age squared  -0.0032***  0.0002  ----  elder people no. over 65  0.0376  0.0283  0.0064 
Communist  -0.1642**  0.0674  -0.0254 Friends/relatives outside  0.0694**  0.0303  0.0117 
health very good  0.2367  0.2136  0.0436 Friends/relatives vil. cadre  0.0612*  0.0350  0.0106 
health good  0.1650  0.2126  0.0273 dist. nearest trans. terminal  0.0008 0.0017  0.00013
health so so  -0.0398  0.2188  -0.0066 dist. country seat  0.0004 0.0007  0.00006
health bad  -0.0396  0.2406  -0.0066 vil. per capita inc.  -0.0592*  0.0318  -0.0101
primary school  0.2868**  0.1191  0.0533 vil. per capita inc. squared  0.0011  0.0041  0.0002 
junior high school  0.4200***  0.1186  0.0717 mountain area  0.1751***  0.0392  0.0317 
senior high school  0.2517**  0.1236  0.0482 hill area  0.1996***  0.0330  0.0354 
tech school or more  0.2388*  0.1283  0.0463 mig_1998  1.8111***  0.2557  0.3081 
household labor force  0.2339***  0.0114  0.0398 intercept  -4.6432***  0.2976  ---- 
family per capita land  -0.0723***  0.0076  -0.0123        
               
Pseudo R2  0.2274             
Log likelihood  -5635.632             
Number of obs  16401             
 
Note: *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels respectively. Standard Errors are in 
parentheses. Age on migration probability has an inverse-U shape relationship. The marginal effect is 0.0340-age*0.00109. In 
the above table, we report the marginal effect when age equals 34.6, the mean age in the sample. Health may also have 
impact on the migration probability, if we put the continuous health variable instead of the discrete ones in the regression 












Table 4: Robustness Check 
Dependent Variable: Migrant or not (Migrant=1, Non-migrant=0) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Peer effect 
















Interaction of Peer effect with Social Distance 







   






   
mig ratio×info just so so 





   
mig ratio×info sometimes 




   
  
mig ratio×borrow very 
frequently 







mig ratio×borrow often 







mig ratio×borrow just so 
so 














   
 
mig ratio×help very 
frequently  







mig ratio×help often 







mig ratio×help just so so 





   
mig ratio×help sometimes 





   
mig ratio×housing very 
frequently 








mig ratio×housing often 

























mig ratio×care very 
frequently 
  -0.4098 
(0.3211) 





mig ratio×care often 
  -0.3779* 
(0.2279) 





mig ratio×care just so so 
  -0.4567*** 
(0.1700) 
  
  -0.4412*** 
(0.1396) 
mig ratio×care sometimes 
  -0.3589** 
(0.1593) 
   
  -0.0273 
(0.1371)   
mig ratio×Days of Bang 
Gong in 2002 
 
 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Individual, family and 
village characteristics 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County Dummy  Y  Y        




Y Y Y Y Y Y 
            
Pseudo R2  0.3014 0.3058  0.2227 0.2215 0.2225 0.2233 0.2220 0.1884 
Log Likelihood  -5010.543 -4979.187  -5670.543 -5678.630 -5671.875 -5666.078 -5675.126 -1964.986
Number of obs  15730 15730  16401 16401 16401 16401 16401 10200 
























Table 5: Probit Regression Result (Continuous Social Interactions) 
Dependent Variable: Migrant or not (Migrant=1, Non-migrant=0) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Peer effect 






















(0.0550)    -0.0847*




(0.0478)      -0.1055***




(0.0475)      -0.1514*** 




(0.0504)       -0.0993** 
(0.0441) 
Individual, household and 
village characteristics 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Village Migration Ratio 
1998 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Pseudo R2  0.2254 0.2223 0.2215 0.2217 0.2222 0.2216 
Log Likelihood  -5650.8732 -5672.8737 -5679.2534 -5677.4899 -5673.9726 -5678.2423 
Number of obs  16401 16401 16401 16401 16401 16401 

































Table 6: Two Stage IV-Probit Regression 
Dependent Variable: Migrant or not (Migrant=1, Non-migrant=0) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Second Stage Result 




(0.9095)      
borrow money×village 
migration ratio   
-1.3099 
(10.5597)     
mutual help× 
village migration ratio     
-0.3044 
(3.0132)    
labor house× 





















village characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y 
Village Migration 
Ratio 1998  Y Y Y Y Y 
 
First Stage Result 





























       
Number  of  obs  16240 16240 16240 16240 16240 
Log likelihood  -7606.5787  -5965.8738 -8328.9546 -8401.6227 -7455.0887 
Wald test of exogeneity 
Prob > chi2  0.7447 0.9134 0.9468 0.9803 0.9478 


















































































Figure 1 shows the relationship between village migration ratio and mean individual out migration 
probability (simulation parameters are from table 3). When the two values equal (cut the 45 degree line), it 



















































































Figure 2 shows the policy effect of increasing education investment on out migration decision. We assume 
every sample individual receives at least nine year compulsory education (junior high school level). The 

















































































policy: increasing peer effects
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the policy effect of increasing pro-peer effect social interaction on migration 
decision. In here, we control the information sharing interaction at “very frequently” while set the three 
labor market interactions at “none/few”. The intuitive policy measures are establishing formal job 
information broadcasting institution and labor service enterprises in rural areas. For such policies, the 





















































































Figure 4 combines Figure 2, 3 and additionally shows the overall policy effect of increasing both education 
















































































Figure 5 shows the effect of rural-urban labor market integration on out migration decision (long dash line). 
Though in our framework we do not have explicit parameters to measure the extent of labor market 
discrimination against rural migrants, we increase the intercept term, which is exogenous and homogenous 
to every sample individual and thus can represent the “institutional change”, to demonstrate the effect of 
market integration. We increase intercept from -4.6432 to -4.4399 and the equilibrium migration ratio 
reaches 50%. 
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